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RECENT CASE NOTES
property. The bankrupt may, in some instances make a valid transfer
of title at some time between the filing of the petition and the adjudication.7
Although the title vests in the trustee as of the date of adjudication,
the "property which vests in the trustee is that which the bankrupt owned
at the time of the filing of the petition."s Property acquired by the bank-
rupt after the filing of the petition is not, to- use the language of the Act,
property which "prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means
have transferred." There is a distinction between the time of vesting of
title in the trustee and what property vests at that time which seemingly
was overlooked in the principal case.
S. K.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-ESTOPPEL - An
incorporated town purchased fire equipment from X company. This was
unquestionably within its powers.' As payment for said apparatus, four
promissory notes bearing interest at the rate of six per cent per annum
were given by the town to X company. Said notes were transferred to
the appellant in due course, for a valuable consideration, and before
maturity. The appellant later sought to enforce collection of two of said
notes alleged to be due and unpaid.
The appellee town demurred to the complaint on the ground that it did
not appear therein that the state board of tax commissioners had approved
the issuance and execution by the appellee of the notes sued upon. Appellee
relied upon a statute providing among other things that: "All bonds or
other evidences of indebtedness hereafter issued or sold by any municipal
corporation of this state may bear interest not to exceed six per cent
per annum provided that the state board of tax commissioners shall approve
all such issues where rate of interest is in excess of five per cent."2 The
demurrer was sustained by the trial court and judgment was rendered
for appellee thereon when appellant elected to stand upon its complaint.
Held, judgment affirmed. Failure to obtain such approval renders the
notes void.3
The case exhibits with exacting clarity the burdens upon one who
accepts such evidence of indebtedness of a municipal corporation. The
instrument shows on its face that it has been issued by a municipality.
This alone charges the holder thereof with notice of statutory requirements
that are prerequisite to a valid issue of the obligation.4 To make his
position secure, he must convince himself prior to accepting the instrument
that all such requirements for a valid issuing thereof have been satisfied.
It obviously follows in view of these facts that if action is brought on
the note or bond, the complaint must allege that the instrument was issued
in the manner prescribed by law, or said complaint is subject to demurrer.
TIn re Perpall, 271 F. 466, 46 A. B. 1. 302; Johnson v. Collier, 222 U. S. 538,
56 L. Ed. 306, 32 Sup. CL 104, 27 A. B. R. 454; Matter of Mertens, 142 Fed. 445,
73 C. C. A. 561; In re J. VI. Lavery & Son, 235 Fed. 910, 37 A. B. R. 606; Gordon v.
Mech. d Grodus Ins. Co., 45 So. 384. 22 A. B. R. 649.
8 Everett v. Hudson, 228 U. S. 474, 57 L. Ed. 927.
' Burns' Ann. St. 1926, see. 11277, subdlv. 3.
S Burns' Ann. St. 1926, sec. 14240, par. 2.
'Citizens' Bank of Anderson v. Town of Burnettsville, 179 N. E. 724, Appellate
Court of Indiana, Feb. 13, 1932.
' Oppenheimer v. Greencastle School Twp. (1905), 164 Ind. 99, 72 N. E. 1100.
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The principal case is quite analogous to Oppenheimer v. Greencastle
School Township,5 wherein an assignee of a township warrant sued the
said township thereon.6 The complaint did not allege that the debt was
contracted in accordance with certain statutory requirements "concerning
township business." It was held that the complaint was defective even
though it did allege that the plaintiff purchased the warrant for value,
before maturity, and without actual notice of non-compliance with the
aforesaid requirements. The court declared that if the debt was not
contracted in the required manner, "as must be presumed against the
pleader, the contract was absolutely void."7
The basis of the result is the fact that municipal corporations possess
only delegated and limited powers. Their power and duties consist only
of those expressly prescribed by statute and those that are necessarily
or reasonably implied for the accomplishment of the purpose of their
creation.8 Likewise the statutory mode of exercising such powers must
he followed. 9 "Where the charter or statute under which the municipal
corporation is created, or other legislative act applicable, directs in precise
or definite terms the manner in which certain corporate acts are to be
executed * * * such specification must be substantially followed."10
The justification of the statute here in question is obvious. Increased
indebtedness at high rates of interest necessarily will increase the expenses
of municipal administration. These increased expenses will inevitably
demand higher taxes. Therefore, the board of tax commissioners are given
the power to supervise and regulate the issue of evidence of indebtedness
at high rates of interest. The court correctly held the provision to be
mandatory.
Estoppel does not apply to this situation. The act of the city was
unauthorized by law, and was consequently void. No estoppel can arise
from a void contract of this nature.'1 As stated in Eastern Illinois State
Normal School v. Charleston,12 "everyone is presumed to know the extent
of the powers of a municipal corporation, and it cannot be estopped to
aver its incapacity, which would amount to conferring power to do
unauthorized acts simply because it has done them and received the
consideration stipulated for."
It has been held, however, that these principles are to be limited to
cases involving statutory provisions, as distinguished from those wherein
mere ordinances of the municipality are in question. In Citizens' Savings
5 Supra, note 4.
' The statute involved in the principal case likewise applies to townships and
counties. Burns' Ann. St. 1926, sec. 14244.
7Cf. Van Hess v. Bd. of Comrs. of St. Joseph County (1921), 190 Ind. 347,
129 N. E. 305.
s East Chicago Co. v. City of East Chicago, (1909) 171 Ind. 654, 87 N. E. 12.
'City of Indianapolis v. College Park Land Co., (1918) 187 Ind. 541, 115
N. E. 356; Campbell v. Brackett, (1910) 45 Ind. App. 293, 90 N. E. 777; Cooper v.
Town of Middletown, (1914) 56 Ind. App. 374, 105 N. E. 393.
1oMcQuillin, Muncie Corp. (2nd Ed.), sec. 386.
2'Eddy Valve Co. v. Crown Point, (1906) 166 Ind. 613, 76 N. E. 536; Pettis v.
Johnson, 56 Ind. 139; Mattox v. Hightshue, 39 Ind. 95.
1271 Ill. 602, 111 N. E. 573, L. R. A. 1916D, 991.
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Bank v. City of Newburyport,13 the defendant city relied upon a city
ordinance providing that "no money shall be drawn out of the city treasury
except on the written order of the mayor addressed to the treasurer,
and countersigned by the city clerk." There was no statutory provision
corresponding to this ordinance, the latter therefore being a mere regulation
by the city of its own affairs. The court said, " * * * unless there
is a statutory requirement of that nature, we never have understood that
any innocent holder of negotiable paper of any municipality is required
to assure himself that a warrant has issued in accordance with such
provision * * *." This would seem to be a wise and just limitation on
the burdens of such innocent holders.
P. J. D.
PLEADING-ACTIONS FOR DEATH OP' MINOR CHIL--DAMAGES-Action to
recover for loss of services and funeral expenses, occasioned by the death
of the appellant's minor son, alleged to have been caused by the negligence
of the appellee. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and
assessed damages to the amount of $1. The appellant in his appeal
contended that the damages were two small to be sustained by the evidence,
and based his appeal on clause 5, Sec. 610-Buri 1926, which allows a
new trial in cases of "error in assessment of the amount of recovery,
whether too large or too small, where the action is upon a contract or
for the injury or detention of property". The appellee contended that a
new trial was-barred by Sec. 611-Burns 1926, which provides that "a
new trial may not be granted on account of the smallness of the damages
in actions for injury to the person or reputation, * * *". Held, the
action is based on an injury to a property right. Damages erroneous.1
The doctrine that there are two causes of action in cases of injury
or death of a minor child, one in favor of the child or his representative
and the other by the parent of the child, has been recognized under both
the common law and under the statutes. This is now well established
doctrine in Indiana,2 and is widely accepted in the majority of other states.3
The child's or representative's action is based upon the injuries personal
to the child, such as pain, suffering, permanent injury and impairment
21169 Fed. 766 (1909).
1 Thompson v. Fort Branch, Supreme Court of Indiana, Nov. 20, 1931, 178
N. E. 440.
2 Long v. Morrison, (1860) 14 Ind. 595, 77 Am. Dec. 72; Rogers v. Smith, (1861)
17 Ind. 323, 79 Am. Dec. 483; Ohio & Mississippi R. R. Co. v. Tindall, (1859) 13
Ind. 366, 74 Am. Dec. 259; Pennsylvania Co. v. Lilly, (1881) 73 Ind. 252; Pittsburgh,
eto. By. Co. v. Vining's Admr., (1867) 27 Ind. 513, 92 Am. Dec. 269; Louisville, etc.
By. Co. v. Goodykoontz, (1888) 119 Ind. 111, 21 N. E. 472; Mayhew v. Burns,
(1885) 103 Ind. 328, 2 N. E. 793; Public Utilities Co. v. Whitehead, (1921) 78 Ind.
App. 85, 134 N. E. 894; Boyd v. Blaisdell, (1860) 15 Ind. 73.
' Tdd V. Skinner, (1919) 225 N. Y. 422, 122 N. E. 247; Cowden v. Wright,
(1841) 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 429, 35 Am. Dec. 633; King v. Viscoloid, (1914) 219 Mass.
420, 106 N. E. 988; McGreevey v. Boston Elev. Co., (1919) 232 Mass. 347, 122 N. E.
278; McGarr v. Natl. and Providence Worsted M ils, (1902) 24 R. I. 447, 53 Ati.
320; W ndle v. Davis, (1922) 275 Pa. 23, 118 Ati. 503; McClellan v. L. P. Dow Co.,
(1911) 114 Minn. 418, 131 N. W. 485; Lascher v. Venus, (1922) 177 Wis. 558, 188
N. W. 613; Snyder v. Klink, (1922) 273 Pa. 234, 116 At. 811; Nolan v. Moore,
(1921) 81 Fla. 594, 88 So. 601; Netherland v. Hollander, (1894) 59 Fed. 417, 8
C. C. A. 169.
